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Abstract—Deception is a common and essential behavior in
humans. Since human beings gain many advantages from decep-
tive capabilities, we can also assume that robotic deception can
provide benefits in several ways. Particularly, the use of robotic
deception in human-robot interaction contexts is becoming an
important and interesting research question. Despite its impor-
tance, very little research on robot deception has been conducted.
Furthermore, no basic metrics or definitions of robot deception
have been proposed yet. In this paper, we review the previous
work on deception in various fields including psychology, biology,
and robotics and will propose a novel way to define a taxonomy
of robot deception. In addition, we will introduce an interesting
research question of robot deception in HRI contexts and discuss
potential approaches.
Index Terms—Robot Deception; Robot Behavior; Human-
Robot Interaction; Robot Ethics
I. INTRODUCTION
Deception is a common behavior not only in humans but
also in animals. Various biological research findings demon-
strate that animals act deceptively in several ways to enhance
their chances of survival. In human interaction, deception is
ubiquitous, occurs frequently during peoples development and
is present in personal relationships, sports, culture, and even
war. Thus, it is fair to assume that, similar to animals and
humans, robots can also benefit from the appropriate use of
deceptive behavior.
Since the use of deceptive capabilities in robotics features
many potential benefits, it is becoming an important and
interesting research question. Despite its importance, however,
very little research on robot deception has been conducted until
recently. Much of the current research on robot deception [1],
[2], [3] focuses on applications and not on fundamental theory,
such as the definition of a taxonomy for robot deception. For
more details, we review previous research on robot deception
in Section II
We contend that defining robot deception and establishing
a taxonomy for it are important as a foundation for further
robotics research on the subject, and herein we present such
a taxonomy. To accomplish this, in Section III we carefully
review different ways of defining deception from the fields
of psychology, biology, and the military, and survey previous
research on robot deception.
Since the use of social robots in everyday life is increasing,
we particularly concentrate on robot deception in Human-
Robot Interaction (HRI) contexts. We hypothesize that a robot,
in order to be intelligent and interactive, should have deceptive
capabilities that may benefit not only the robot itself but also
its deceived human partner, in some cases to the detriment
of the deceiver (the robot). In Section IV, we focus on
robot deception, specifically in HRI contexts, and present an
interesting research question and potential approaches to its
answer.
In sum, this paper has two main goals: 1) to introduce a
taxonomy of robot deception, and 2) to provide a research
question of robot deception in HRI. First, we present a
novel way to define robot deception and then characterize
a taxonomy of robot deception. Second, we focus on robot
deception in HRI contexts, which leads to the following
research question:
Can a robots deceptive behaviors benefit a deceived human
partner in HRI contexts?
In Section IV , some initial ideas to answer this research
question are also presented. Even though robot deception can
provide several advantages to humans, it is arguable whether it
is morally acceptable to deceive humans at all in HRI contexts.
We consider this ethical issue and introduce some perspectives
to approach robot deception problems in Section V.
II. PREVIOUS RESEARCH
Endowing robots with the capacity for deception has sig-
nificant potential utility [4], similar to its use in humans and
animals. Clearly, deceptive behaviors are useful in the military
domain [5], [6]. Sun Tzu stated in The Art of War, “All
warfare is based on deception.” Military robots capable of
deception could mislead opponents in a variety of ways. As
both individual and teams of robots become more prevalent
in the militarys future [7], [8], robotic deception can provide
new advantages apart from the more traditional one of force
multiplication.
In other areas, such as search and rescue or healthcare,
deceptive robots might also add value, for example, for calming
victims or patients when required for their own protection.
Conceivably, even in the field of educational robots, the
deceptive behavior of a robot teacher may potentially play a
role in improving human learning efficiency.
Despite the ubiquity in nature and the potential benefits of
deception, very few studies have been done on robotics to date.
One interesting application in robot deception is the camou-
flage robot, developed at Harvard University [1]. Camouflage is
a widely used deception mechanism in animals and militaries.
Inspired by these real-world usages, the researchers at Harvard
developed this soft robot, which can automatically change the
color of body to match its environment.
Motion camouflage has also been studied for robot systems.
Unlike the previous type of camouflage, motion camouflage is
a behavioral deception capability observed in dragonflies. By
following indirect trajectories, dragonflies can deceptively ap-
proach as if they were remaining stationary from the perspec-
tive of the prey. Carey et al. [9] developed an optimal control
mechanism to generate these motion camouflage trajectories
and verified it with simulation results. For real robot systems,
more recent research in [10] proposed new motion camouflage
techniques that are applicable to unicycle robots.
Floreano’s research group [2] demonstrated robots evolving
deceptive strategies in an evolutionary manner, learning to
protect energy sources. Their work illustrates the ties between
biology, evolution, and signal communication and does so on
a robotic platform. They showed that cooperative communica-
tion evolves when robot colonies consist of genetically similar
individuals. In contrast, when the robot colonies were dis-
similar, some of the robots evolved deceptive communication
signals.
Wagner and Arkin [4] used interdependence theory and
game theory to develop algorithms that allow a robot to
determine both when and how it should deceive others. More
recent work at Georgia Tech is exploring the role of deception
according to Grafen’s dishonesty model [11] in the context
of bird mobbing behavior [12]. Another study is developing
robot’s deceptive behavior inspired by biology. It applies
squirrel’s food protection behavior to robotic systems and
shows how a robot successfully uses this deception algorithm
for resource protection [3].
Much research on robot deception has also been proposed
in HRI contexts. Terada and Ito [13] demonstrated that a
robot is able to deceive a human by producing a deceptive
behavior contrary to the human subject’s prediction. These
results illustrated that an unexpected change of the robot’s
behavior gave rise to an impression in the human of being
deceived by the robot.
Other research shows that robot deceptive behavior can
increase users’ engagement in robotic game domains. Work
at Yale University [14] illustrated increased engagement with
a cheating robot in the context of a rock-paper-scissors game.
They proved greater attributions of mental state to the robot
by the human players when participants played against the
cheating robots. At Carnegie Mellon University [15] a study
showed an increase of users’ engagement and enjoyment in
a multi-player robotic game in the presence of a deceptive
robot referee. By declaring false information to game players
about how much players win or lose, they observed whether
this behavior affects a human’s general motivation and interest
based on frequency of winning, duration of playing, and so on.
These results indicate that deceptive behaviors are potentially
beneficial not only in the military domain but also in a human’s
everyday context.
Brewer et al. shows that deception can be used in a
robotic physical therapy system [16]. By giving deceptive
visual feedback on the amount of force patients currently exert,
patients can perceive the amount of force lower than the actual
amount. As a result, patients can add additional force and get
benefits during the rehabilitation.
Recent work from the University of Tsukuba [17] shows
that a deceptive robot partner can improve the learning effi-
ciency of children. In this study, the children participated in
a learning game with a robot partner, which pretends to learn
from children. In other words, the robot partner in this study
is a care-receiving robot, which enables children to learn by
teaching [18]. The goal of this learning game is for kids to
draw the shape of corresponding English words such as circle,
square, and so on. The interesting part is that the robot acted
as an instructor, but deliberately made mistakes and behaved
as if it did not know the answer. According to the results,
by showing these unknowing/unsure behaviors, the learning
efficiency of the children was significantly increased. Since
robots’ unsure/dumb behaviors can affect a humans learning
efficiency, we assume that these results relate to a robot’s
deceptive capabilities. As a result, we can conclude that this
study provides preliminary results of the positive effects of
robots’ deceptive behavior in HRI contexts.
III. TAXONOMY OF ROBOT DECEPTION
A. Taxonomies of Deception from a Human Perspective
In other disciplines, researchers have developed the defini-
tions and taxonomies of deception drawing from the fields of
psychology, biology, military, engineering, etc. In this section,
several ways to define and categorize deception in different
fields are reviewed followed by a suggested taxonomy of
deception from a robotic perspective.
Deception has been studied extensively by observing dif-
ferent human cases. Several ways to define and categorize
deception have been proposed already by different psycholo-
gists and philosophers. Chisholm and Freehan [19] categorized
deception from a logical and philosophical viewpoint. Three
dimensions were described for distinguishing among types
of deception such as commission-omission (the attitude of
the deceiver; the deceiver “contributes causally toward” the
mark’s changes or the deceiver “allows” the mark’s changes
with respect to belief states), positive-negative (the belief state
of the mark; the deceiver makes the mark believe that false
proposition is true vs. true proposition is false), and intended-
unintended (whether the deceiver changes the mark’s belief
state or merely sustains it). From the combination of those
three dimensions, they provided eight categories of human
deception as shown in Table I(a).
From the results of diary studies and surveys, DePaulo
[20] divides deception in four different ways: content, type,
referent, and reasons (Table I(b)). Subcategories of these kinds
of deception are also observed and defined. Subcategories of
content are feelings, achievements, actions, explanations, and
facts. In the category of reasons, there are subcategories of
self-oriented and other-oriented deception. In type category,
outright, exaggerations, and subtle were defined as subcate-
gories. Also, four different referents were suggested such as
liar, target, other person, and object/event.
Military is one of the biggest contexts for the use of decep-
tive behavior. Dunnigan and Nofi [21] proposed a taxonomy of
deception based on ways to generate the deceptive behaviors
as shown in Table I(d).
Whaley [22], [23] suggested six categories of deception and
grouped them into two sets. The six categories of deception
are masking, repackaging, dazzling, mimicking, inventing, and
decoying. These categories are grouped into dissimulation and
simulation (Table I(d)). The first three, masking, repacking and
dazzling, are categorized as dissimulation (the concealment
of truth) and the others are in the simulation category (the
exhibition of false).
Recently, Erat and Gneezy [24] classified four types of
deception based on their consequences: selfish black lies, spite
black lies, pareto white lies, and altruistic white lies (Table
I(c)).
In cyberspace, deception happens frequently and a taxon-
omy of deception has been proposed by Rowe et al. [25]
for this domain. They defined seven categories of cyberspace
deception based on linguistic case theory, including: space,
time, participant, causality, quality, essence, and speech-act.
By exploring subcategories on each case, they proposed 32
types for a taxonomy of cyberspace deception (Table I(e)).
Many deceptive behaviors are also observed in nonhuman
cases. Animal deception can be categorized into depending on
its cognitive complexity [26], specifically the two categories of
unintentional and intentional animal deception (Table I(f)). Un-
intentional animal deception includes mimicry and camouflage.
In contrast, intentional deception requires more sophisticated
behavioral capacities such as broken-wing displays or in many
non-human primate examples such as chimpanzee communi-
cation [27].
Recently, researchers in Human-Computer Interaction
(HCI) defined the notion of benevolent deception, which aims
to benefit not only the developers but also the users [28]. They
have not proposed a taxonomy of deception, but provided new
design principles regarding deception in HCI.
B. A Taxonomy of Robot Deception
Based on previous efforts in this area, a taxonomy of robot
deception was developed. Similar to human and animal de-
ception, robot deception occurs during the interactions among
robots or between humans and robots. Therefore, analyzing
these interactions can identify the key factors to categorize
1The chart is reproduced with permission from [24]’s Figure 1. Taxonomy
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TABLE II: Three Dimensions for Robot Deception Taxonomy
robot deception. Similar to Chisholm and Freehans approach
[19], we specify the salient dimensions of robot deception first,
and then define a taxonomy of robot deception based on these
characteristics.
The three dimensions of robotic deception are defined as
deception object, deception goal, and deception method (Table
II). First, interaction object indicates with whom the robot
interacts with and thus tries to deceive. In this dimension,
deception can be classified into the two categories of robot-
human deception, and in robot-nonhuman deception.
The second dimension is deception goal. This approach is
similar to the distinctions in DePaulo’s taxonomy, especially
the reason category [20], by categorizing robot deception
based on the reason why a robot tries to deceive others: self-
oriented deception and other-oriented deception. Self-oriented
deception means that the robot’s deceptive behaviors benefit
the robot itself. In contrast, other-oriented deception occurs
when the goal of robot deception is to provide advantage to
the deceived robots or human partners, even at the robot’s own
expense.
The final dimension is deception method, which is the way
by which the robot generates deception. This dimension is
similar to the taxonomy of animal deception: intentional and
unintentional deception. It includes embodiment/physical de-
ception and mental/behavioral deception. Embodiment decep-
tion indicates deception resulting from the robot’s morphology
such as camouflage. In mental/behavioral deception, a robot
deliberately generates intentional deceptive behaviors.
From the combinations of those three dimensions, we can
define a taxonomy of robot deception as shown in Table III.
Each element of the taxonomy (type) consists of a combination
of three categories, one from each dimension, providing eight
different types of robot deception. The table also includes
examples of each type of robot deception. As shown in this
table, N-S-P and N-O-P types do not have specific examples
in robot contexts yet. Therefore, we exclude these two types
from further consideration. Thus, based on the characteristics
of interactions in current robot systems, six different types of
robot deception are defined to constitute our taxonomy of robot
(a)
(b)
Fig. 1: FSA for robot deception algorithms: (a) High-level
FSA: caching and patrolling behaviors of squirrel robot, (b)
Sub-FSA: food patrolling (top: normal, bottom: deception)
Fig. 2: Robot Experiment Layout with Two Pioneer Robots
deception.
C. Robot Deception: A Case Study
A taxonomy for robot deception was presented above by
defining salient dimensions and categories. In our previous
research [3], we developed and evaluated a robot’s deceptive
behaviors for resource protecting strategies, which is poten-
tially applicable in military context and inspired by biology.
The patrolling strategy used by Eastern Grey Squirrels is one
interesting example in nature regarding the possible role of
deception [30], where they use deception to protect their food
caches from other predators.
Briefly, the squirrel spends time visiting stocked food
caches. It was observed, however, that when a predator is
present, the squirrel changes its patrolling behavior to spend
time visiting empty cache sites, with the apparent intent to
mislead the raider into the belief that those sources are where
the valuables are located, a diversionary tactic of sorts.
Inspired by these deceptive behaviors of squirrels, we devel-
oped and implemented deception algorithms for a robot. Figure
1a illustrates the high-level model of algorithms using a finite
state acceptor (FSA). After caching is complete, the robot then
begins to move between the caching locations in order to patrol
its resources. The behaviors of the robot include goal-oriented
movement, selecting places, and waiting behavior as shown
Taxonomy Definition Examples
H-S-P Deceiving human for deceiver robot’s own benefit using physicalinteractions Camouflage robots - DARPA’s soft robot [1]
N-S-P Deceiving other robot or nonhuman for deceiver robot’s ownbenefit using physical interactions N/A
H-O-P Deceiving human for deceived human’s benefit using physicalinteractions Android Robots
N-O-P Deceiving other robot or nonhuman for deceived other’s benefitusing physical interactions N/A
H-S-B Deceiving humans for deceiver robot’s own benefit usingbehavioral interactions Robot deception in HRI [13]
N-S-B Deceiving other robots or nonhumans for deceiver robot’s selfbenefit using behavioral interactions
Mobbing robot [12], Robot deception using interdependence
theory [4], Squirrel-like resource protection robot [3]
H-O-B Deceiving humans for deceived human’s benefit using behavioralinteractions
Robot deception in entertainment [14], Deceptive robot learner
for children [17], Robot referees for human game players [15]
N-O-B Deceiving other robots or nonhumans for deceived other’sbenefit using behavioral interactions Robot Sheepdog [29]
TABLE III: Robot Deception Taxonomy




TABLE IV: Robot Experiment Results with Convergence Rate
in Figure 1b. Initially, the robot employs the true patrolling
strategy when the select-true-location trigger is activated. This
trigger calculates which of the many caching locations the
robot should patrol in the current step. The calculation is
made by random selection based on the transition probabilities
among the places. Transition probabilities are determined by
the number of cached items. In other words, if a place has more
items, the probability of visiting that place is higher. When a
competitor robot is detected, the squirrel robot starts the false
patrolling strategy and selects/goes to false-patrolling-locations
as shown in Figure 1b.
This is a form of misdirection, where communication is
done implicitly through a behavioral change by the deceiver.
We implemented this strategy in simulation [3], and showed
that these deceptive behaviors worked effectively, enabling
robots to perform better using deception than without with
respect to delaying the time of the discovery of the cache. We
also evaluated this algorithm by applying it to real robot system
using the experimental layout in Figure 2. Table IV illustrates
the results of experiments. As the graphs show, experimental
results with deception converges to the predator’s maximum
successful pilferages more slowly than without deception.
Therefore, it can be concluded that the deception algorithm
leads to a robot’s better resource protection performance.
This deception capability for a robot can be categorized
in terms of our taxonomy. First, the object that a robot tries
to deceive is other competitor robot, which means nonhuman
objects (N). The deception happens through the robot’s be-
haviors by intentionally misleading the competitor robot (B).
In deception goal dimension, the benefits of this deception
capability are protecting the deceiver’s resources longer, so the
squirrel robot obtains advantage: i.e., self-oriented deception
(S). As a result, this squirrel robot deception is classified as
N-S-B type in our taxonomy.
Other applications of robot deception can be similarly
categorized in the taxonomy. Examples of how to categorize
various forms of robot deception in the taxonomy are shown
in Table III.
IV. OTHER-ORIENTED ROBOT DECEPTION IN HRI
Many researchers aim to build social robots that feature
intentionality. According to Dennett [31], a high-order inten-
tionality can be achieved by adding several different features,
notably deception capability. In other words, more intentional
and autonomous social robots are possible when deception
capabilities are added. Therefore, research on robot deception
is arguably an important topic in HRI studies.
HRI studies generally aim to evaluate how a robot affects
human partners, and the goal of such studies is usually to
achieve effective and positive interactions between robots and
humans. Similarly, it is necessary to consider the potential
benefits to human partners when we are dealing with robot
deception in HRI contexts. In other words, one goal of a robot’s
deceptive behaviors in HRI should be to provide advantage to
the deceived human.
Earlier we saw several studies in the field of psychology that
defined deception in different ways. In particular, DePaulo [20]
defined and characterized a taxonomy for human deception
based on motivations such as self-oriented and other-oriented
deception. We also capture this category in the taxonomy of
robot deception presented in the previous section and defined
one dimensions based on the deception’s goal.
Other-oriented robot deception should be developed and
evaluated when applying deception capabilities to robots that
interact with human partners in different HRI contexts for their
benefit. As a result, we ask:
Can a robots deceptive behaviors benefit a deceived human
partner in HRI contexts?
The notion of other-oriented deception has been also pro-
posed in HCI as benevolent deception [28]. However, the
embodied nature of a robotic agent distinguishes it from
traditional HCI with respect to the effect on a human actor.
Therefore, it is required to develop principles of other-oriented
robot deception in HRI separately.
To answer this research question, the following research
steps are being undertaken. First, a computational model and
associated algorithms need to be developed specifically for
other-oriented robot deception. The computational model must
then be implemented and embedded on a robotic platform. The
effects of this type of deception should be evaluated using HRI
studies that are carefully constructed and conducted to observe
whether the deceived human partners could truly obtain benefit
from a robot’s other-oriented deception capabilities.
We also characterize the situational conditions pertaining
to the application and utility of other-oriented deception,
by grouping and characterizing relevant situations of other-
oriented deception. From reviewing various situations when
other-oriented deception occurs between humans, they can
be grouped along two dimensions: 1) the time duration of
the deception; and 2) the payoff of the mark (the deceived
person). The time dimension ranges from one-shot to short-
term to long-term, referring to the length of time deception
is maintained by the deceiver’s actions. The mark’s payoff is
categorized by the effect on the mark’s outcome (ranging from
high to low payoff).
As shown in Figure 3, representative other-oriented exam-
ples in these dimensions are illustrated by their location in this
two dimensional space. They include:
1. Crisis management is a situation where the deceiver’s
deceptive behaviors or lies must have a rapid effect on the mark
(short-term) perhaps in a life-threatening high payoff situation.
For example, other-oriented deception in a search-and-rescue
situation may involve immediate emotional or physiological
remediation for a victim. Lying to a mark regarding the
direness of their situation in order to calm him/her down or
to increase their confidence may increase their likelihood of
survival in this life critical situation.
2. When someone faces highly stressful situation such as
a big presentation in front of huge crowd or an athletic trial,
people sometimes lie to cheer up / increase their confidence to
let the speaker calm down in short-term such as “Don’t worry!
You’re perfectly prepared” or “I know you can successfully do
this.”
3. Quality of Life Management (QoLM) involves maintain-
ing deception over long periods of time, again for potential life-
critical (health) situations in therapeutic treatment of serious or
generative illness, or regarding status of long-term economic
well-being. For example, placebos may be persistently used
for a deceived patient’s long-term benefit [32]. Long-term
lying can also be used in a similar manner with the hopes
of benefitting the patient.
4. Sometimes, teachers also behave deceptively or lie for
Fig. 3: Situational Conditions for Other-oriented Deception
with Examples
educational purposes, perhaps playing dumb for example [17].
This deception can increase the student’s learning efficiency,
and it produces long-term benefits to the mark, although the
deceit may be either short or long-term.
5. One-Shot Casual Lies are common in general conversa-
tion [20]. Generally, deceivers act deceptively or tell a lie to
maintain the mark’s emotional state for good. For example,
general lies such as “you look nice today” or “I like your
clothes” are obvious examples of 1-shot casual lies. These are
not life-critical situations. “That was a great presentation” can
also be another such example.
6. Flattery also ranges from the short- to long-term to make
the mark’s emotional state beneficial to their performance.
Persistent flattery is an example (e.g., “a**-kissing”) that
makes the mark feel undeservedly better about themselves for
a relatively long-term period. In this long-term case, benefit
(payoff) accrues for both the mark and the deceiver, but we
focus for now solely on the benefits to the mark.
7. Peoples sometimes feign weakness to make marks feel
better by helping deceivers in short-term periods. Marks can
maintain emotionally good state or feel better and confident
from this deception. For example, a woman might pretend not
to be able to open a jar just to make the man feel better and
more confident about himself.
8. One-shot Jokes or more persistent kidding using de-
ception is also an example of short-term lies, since they
aim to maintain a good atmosphere of social community by
making marks feel at ease perhaps by stating falsehoods about
themselves, others, or a situation in a humorous and non-
truthful way.
9. Promotion of suspension of disbelief uses deception
to provide the mark with fun and enjoyment. For example,
movies, magic, or other fictional works use illusion to deceive
marks. This differs from other examples of deception, since
the mark voluntarily allows herself to be deceived.
10. A masquerade is characterized by deception that persists
for extended periods of time to create an illusion regarding
something that does not exist, but may make the mark feel
better about themselves.
11. Sometimes, people hide distressing information or neg-
ative situations from others, assuming they may be able to
resolve it on their own without additional help from the mark
and so not induce anxiety in the deceived.
HRI studies are being developed that will address vari-
ous sectors of the other-oriented situational space (Fig. 3).
A computational model will be embedded to capture these
relationships and empirically test the value of robotic other-
deception in various contexts.
We aim to approach this problem inspired by Gneezy’s de-
ception study in economics [33]. He proposed the formulation
of humans deceptive behaviors in pair interactions based on
the role of consequences. He modified the utility equation
and proposed a framework for when a deceiver determines
to perform deceptive behaviors.
U = α(DL −DT ) + (1− α)(ML −MT )/(DL −DT )
This formulation calculates the utility of situation. Here, U is
the utility, D is the deceiver, and M is the mark. XL indicates
the payoffs to X when acting deceptively (or lying). XT is
the payoffs to X from acting truly. α is the relative weight
on deceiver’s and mark’s payoffs. Deceiver chooses deceptive
behaviors when the value U from this formulation is larger
than 0 in certain situation.
According to this formulation, the deceiver chooses decep-
tive behaviors based not only on the deceiver’s payoff but also
on the mark’s payoff. Since it is the intention that a robot’s
deceptive behaviors increase the payoff of the deceived human
partner, we extend Gneezy’s formulation to apply it to robot
systems. To do so, the critical part is how to define and quantify
the payoff for the mark. It is necessary to define the payoff
matrix for each situation. We can use situational conditions
as illustrated earlier to group and generalize different payoff
matrices across entire cases.
Developing computational models and algorithms for de-
ceptive capabilities is not an easy task since these capabilities
are also highly related to understanding states of mind. Previ-
ous research in our laboratory has already proposed a novel al-
gorithm for capturing another robot’s internal states during the
decision-making process for deception [4]. The development of
this algorithm was based on human interdependence theory. By
expanding upon this previous research, we expect to develop
computational models for robots’ other-oriented deception.
In sum, we are in the process of building these computa-
tional models for a robot’s other-oriented deception, where we
will extend this framework and apply it to robot systems in
specific situations. It will then be necessary to conduct HRI
studies to evaluate our methods quantitatively.
V. ETHICAL ISSUES
Despite the potential benefits of robot deception, relatively
little research has been conducted to date on this topic,
perhaps due to ethical considerations involving this somewhat
controversial topic. Robot ethics is a rapidly expanding area
[34], [35], [36], [37]. Is deception acceptable even in humans?
Should a robot be allowed to lie?
According to Kantian theory (a deontological perspective),
deception or lies should always be prohibited, a standard
outcome of any ethics classroom in the application of the Cat-
egorical Imperative. By this standard, any deceptive behaviors
or lies are morally incorrect, human or robot. The utilitarian
perspective on the other hand argues that an action is morally
right and acceptable if it leads to increasing total happiness
over all relevant stakeholders. Therefore, we can also argue
that if deception increases the total benefits among the involved
relationships, it is ethically correct [38], [39].
We do not intend to resolve this argument here. In robotics,
it is even more complicated to state the ethical issues related
to deception, as to whether machines should be given the
authority to deceive a human being. It should be carefully
and thoughtfully considered [40] before being developed and
applied, and it is an integral part of our research.
First, we recommend that the use of robot deception should
be in appropriate domains. In this perspective, military robot
deception would be acceptable as long as it is in accord with
the Laws of War. However, we are considering the use of robot
deception in HRI contexts, in which it is currently difficult
to state what if any situations constitute appropriate use. We
intend to evaluate this with our study instruments (e.g., surveys
and post-experiment comments).
The objective or goal is an important criterion in which
to argue for or against robot deception as well as the ethical
framework–i.e, is consequentialism, where the ends justifies
the means, appropriate for a particular situation. The aim of
this paper is not to justify whether robot deception is morally
right or wrong. Rather the main point of this section is to
illustrate the applicability of various ethical frameworks in
considering robotic deception and to make clear that further
discussions of these ethical issues are required by all affected
parties.
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Deception is one of the capabilities that is needed to achieve
high-order intentionality. Therefore, we can assume that adding
deceptive capabilities to robot systems is needed for achieving
social robots; however, few studies have been conducted on
deception in robotics. Furthermore, there is a lack of studies
on fundamental theory, such as the definition of a taxonomy for
robot deception. In this paper, we reviewed previous research
on robot deception and developed a novel taxonomy for its
classification.
Our focus is on the use of other-oriented deception in HRI
contexts. We expect that the use of deception in HRI will
necessarily grow to achieve more intelligent, effective and
natural social robots, and deception, for better or worse, is
an inherent part of the human condition.
A research question has been posed which frames our future
research: what if any are the benefits of robot deception on their
human partners. The situational conditions of other-oriented
deception were characterized serving as a preliminary stage
for the computational models and algorithms being developed
for implementation and testing.
We acknowledge that robot deception is a controversial
research topic from an ethical perspective. The implications of
this and related research should be thoughtfully and carefully
established and discussed.
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